CHERNOBYL'S LEGAL FALLOUT-THE CONVENTION
ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT,
(SEPT. 26, 1986,

-

U.S.T.

-

, T.I.A.S. NO. _

).

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident opened

for signature on September 26, 1986 (at a special session of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's' (IAEA) General Conference
in Vienna). 2 Fifty-one states, including all five states which possess
nuclear weapons, 3 signed the Convention on opening day, allowing
4
it to enter into force on October 27, 1986.

Formed in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an organization of the United Nations whose purpose is to "accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."
See V. LAMM, THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 46
(1984). In fulfilling its purpose, the IAEA serves as an exchange center for scientific
information, organizes scientific studies and conferences, dispatches experts, supplies
and nuclear materials to member states, and coordinates basic and applied research
in the field of nuclear energy. Id.
Membership in the IAEA is open to all states. Representatives of all members
meet annually at the General Conference to discuss matters of relevance to the
atomic industry. See W. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM 124 (1969).
2 See Nuclear Safety Convention to Enter into Force, 1 IAEA NEWSBRIEFS 1
(1986) [hereinafter NEWSBRIFFS]. Delegates from 94 countries and 27 national and
international organizations attended the session for a total of 639 delegates. Id.
On September 27, 1986 the delegates adopted the Convention on Assistance in
the case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency to facilitate prompt assistance
to states in which an accident occurs. Id. at 1. This Convention requires states to
notify the IAEA of available experts, equipment and other helpful materials, and
provides that the IAEA will serve as a center for channeling available information
and services. Id.
During the special session, the member states also adopted a resolution and final
document referring further action on important nuclear safety issues to the IAEA
Board of Governors. These other issues include safety information exchanges, protection of nuclear installations against terrorism and armed attack, proposals for an
international safety regime, nuclear accident liability and compensation, safety standards, and IAEA programs. Id. at 2.
' The states possessing nuclear weapons are China, France, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Soviet Union. See id. at 1.
4 States signing on September 27 were: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico,
Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukranian SSR, Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
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The Convention, the first of its kind, strengthens cooperation
between states concerning the safe use of nuclear energy. It requires'
states to publicize promptly any information concerning nuclear accidents to minimize the transboundary radiological consequences of
such an accident. 5 The Convention applies to nuclear accidents resulting from a broad range of activities, including military and industrial uses of nuclear energy. 6 Its scope is limited, however, in that

notification of accidents resulting from the use or testing of nuclear
7
weapons is not mandatory.
The Convention provides that a state must give notice of a nuclear
accident, either directly or through the IAEA, to all states which are
or may be physically affected as a result of the accident.8 A state
must report the nature, time, and exact location of the accident,
along with any other information which could minimize the radiological effects on other states. 9 The Convention also requires that a

United States and Zimbabwe. See id.
Article XIV of the Convention provides that only three binding signatures are
needed for the Convention to enter into force 30 days thereafter. Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, art. 14, - U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. - [hereinafter Convention].
See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2. The preamble to the Convention sets
out the state parties' motivation for the Convention. The preamble provides that
the parties are "[c]onvinced of the need for States to provide relevant information
about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological
consequences can be minimized." Id. at preamble.
6 See id. at art. 1. Among the facilities to which the Convention refers are: "(a)
any nuclear reactor wherever located; (b) any nuclear fuel cycle facility; [and]'(c)any
radioactive waste management facility." Id.
7 See NEWSBRIEFS, supra note 2, at 1. The United States, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, China, and France, however, all expressed an intention to voluntarily notify in the event of an accident while testing nuclear weapons. See Record
of Final Draft of Convention on Early Notification, Annex V [hereinafter Annex
V]. Consequently, the drafters added article 3 to the Convention which provides
that states may notify in the event of any nuclear accident not covered by the
Convention. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3.
1 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. a. If a state notifies another state
directly, it also must provide this information to the IAEA along with a list of its
authorities designated to issue and receive the required information. The IAEA is
responsible for providing a list of national authorities to state parties and member
states. Id. at art. 7.
9 Id. at art. 2. The required information includes, among other things: the time,
exact location and nature of the accident, the facility or activity involved, the
assumed or established cause, the general characteristics of the radioactive release,
the off-site protective measures taken, and the predicted behavior of the release over
time. For a complete listing, see Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
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state provide supplementary information as it becomes available 0
and, as far as practicable, promptly respond to requests for information by any affected state which is a party to the Convention."
States also must designate authorities responsible for issuing and
receiving the notification and information mandated by the Convention. 12
States may resolve any disputes arising out of noncompliance with
the Convention by neogtiation, arbitration, or other peaceful means. 3
The Convention, which automatically binds the IAEA's sixty-two
member nations,' 4 enters into force for each state thirty days after
the state expresses consent 5 and will remain open for accession by
any competent international organization. 6
10Id. at art. 5, para. 2. Article 5 provides that "[sluch information shall be
supplemented at appropriate intervals by further relevant information on the development of the emergency situation, including its foreseeable or actual termination." Id.

n Id. at art. 6. Article 6 provides that "State[s] .

.

. shall, as far as reasonably

practicable, respond promptly to a request for further information or consultations
sought by an affected State Party with a view to minimizing the radiological consequences in that State." Id.
12 See id. at art. 7, para. 1. The Convention requires states to inform the IAEA
of the authorities it has designated to issue and receive information. State parties
also must "promptly inform the Agency [IAEA] of any changes that may occur in
the information referred to in paragraph 1." Id. at art. 7, para. 2.
13Id. at art. 11. This Article provides for the resolution of disputes which remain
unsettled for more than one year by either arbitration or by decision of the International Court of Justice if requested by any party to the dispute. Id. Parties may
declare themselves not bound by the specific settlement procedures. Parties, however,
are obligated to consult with each other with a view toward peaceful settlement. Id.
at art. 11, para. 1.
'4 See IAEA Conference Studies Chernobyl A-Plant Accident, 46 FACTS ON FILE
634 (1986).
11Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12, para. 4. Signing a convention authenticates
the text, and additionally qualifies the signing state to proceed to ratification. In
addition, signing creates a good faith obligation on the part of that state to refrain
from acts which would frustrate the objects of the treaty. When the signature is
subject to ratification, however, this does not establish consent to be bound or an
obligation to ratify. In the United States consent is given by a two-thirds majority
of the Senate, and the Convention is then ratified by Presidential signature. See I.
BROWNrIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 1979).
16

Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12, para. 5. "Accession .

.

. occurs when a

State which did not sign a treaty, already signed by other States, formally accepts
its provisions. Accession may occur before or after the treaty has entered into force."
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 604.
The Convention provides that international organizations may accede by deposit
of an instrument of accession with the Director General of the IAEA along with a
declaration of its competence respecting "negotiation, conclusion, and application
of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention." Convention,
supra note 4, at art. 12, para. 5.

GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.

[Vol. 17:303

HISTORY

The IAEA called the special session in September, 1986 as a direct
response to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in the Soviet
Union. 17 The Chernobyl accident began with a chemical explosion as
the plant entered into a planned shutdown on April 26, 1986.18 The
world first learned of the accident only after Sweden and Finland
detected windblown debris and gases on their radiation monitors. 9
The Soviet Union's failure to promptly inform, not only surrounding
states, but its own citizens of the accident caused an outrage in the
international community. 20 The Soviets eventually admitted that the

7 See Wellborn, Lifting the Lid on Chernobyl Secrets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56. "Agency officials admit that if Chernobyl had not
taken place, it would have taken years to get members to agree to such rules." Id.
at 57. Another writer stated that "[t]he Chernobyl accident served as a reminder
to many people of the potential danger of nuclear power." Stanfield, The Nuclear
Option, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 5, 1986, at 1647.
18Soviets Reveal Delayed Evacuation, Other Details of Nuclear Accident, CmHMiCAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, May 12, 1986, at 4. [hereinafter Soviets Reveal]. The
Politboro officially attributed the accident to "a series of gross breaches of the
reactor operational regulations by workers at the Atomic Power Station." Text of
the Politboro Statement About Chernobyl, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986, at A3, col.
1. The destruction of the reactor caused radioactive contamination of about 1,000
square kilometers around the station, and officials estimate that direct losses from
the accident amount to about two billion rubles (approximately $2.7 billion dollars).
The death toll rose to 28, while at least 203 others have some form of radiation
sickness. Id. "Scientists at the conference estimate that additional deaths from
radiation-induced cancers will number at least 2000 in decades to come. Other
researchers predict that cancer deaths over the next 70 years will be much higher25,000 or more." Wellborn, supra note 17, at 56.
Soviet officials reported that 49,000 residents around the damaged plant were
evacuated in 1100 buses. The evacuation, which only took two hours and 20 minutes,
was delayed for 36 hours after the shut-down because plant officials failed to grasp
the severity of the accident. See Soviets Reveal, supra, at 4. A later report revealed,
however, that over 135,000 people evacuated an "18-mile danger zone" around
Chernobyl. See Wellborn, supra note 17, at 56.
19 See Davis, Disaster Raises New Questions About Fate of Nuclear Energy,
CONG. Q., May 3, 1986 at 964. United States intelligence agencies gathered most
of the early information through "closed-door briefings featuring dramatic spy
satellite photos of the Chernobyl plant's No. 4 unit with its roof and some walls
blown away." Id.
20See, e.g., McCurdy, We All Have a Right to Know About Chernobyl, CHEhMcAL
WEEK, May 7, 1986 at 3. "At Chernobyl, so far, we have had an essentially complete
press blackout in the U.S.S.R. [which] ... may lead to unwarranted hysteria
worldwide as citizens everywhere worry about the inevitable fallout and its potential
danger." Id. "Every citizen in the world is downwind from Chernobyl. We all
deserve more information and cooperation than the U.S.S.R. has so far been willing
to yield." Id.

1986]

CHERNOBYL'S LEGAL FALLOUT

accident had occurred but were slow in reporting the substantial facts
2
during the following weeks. '
On May 4, 1986 at the Tokyo Economic Summit, representatives
of the European Community and the Heads of State of seven major
industrial nations formally addressed the implications of the Chernobyl accident. 22 These leaders and representatives declared every
country to be responsible for providing prompt, detailed and complete
information on nuclear emergencies and accidents, particularly those
with transboundary consequences. In addition, the representatives
strongly urged the early drafting of an international convention which
would obligate parties to report and exchange information in the

event of a nuclear accident.23

Global reactions to the Chernobyl accident varied.24 Internationally,
the European Parliament adopted a resolution rebuking the Soviet
Union for failing to give timely and adequate information of the
Chernobyl accident. 25 The United States Congress also strongly conSee Davis, supra note 19, at 964. When the Politburo did make a statement
regarding the cause of the accident, it reported that First Deputy Minister of Medium
Machine Building, Meshkov, among others, was relieved of his duties "for bad
21

errors and shortcomings ....

Mr. Meshkov's inclusion in the list of culprits con-

tributed to speculation that the Chernobyl plant may have been used for producing
plutonium for thermonuclear bombs." Schmemann, Chernobyl Answers: New Questions, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986 at A3, col. 4.
2 The Tokyo Summit was the 12th annual summit on world economic issues.
See Tokyo Summit Declaration on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, 37 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 37 (1986) [hereinafter Tokyo Declaration]. The nations

attending the summit were Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, United
States, and West Germany. See Seven Nation Economic Summit Held in Tokyo, 46
FACTS ON FIE 329 (1986).
23 Tokyo Declaration, supra note 22, at 37-38. The representatives further stated
that every country bears an "international responsibility . . . for the safety of the
design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its [nuclear] installations ....

Each of our countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the Government of
the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of Chernobyl, to provide urgently
such information, as our and other countries have requested." Id. The Representatives
noted with satisfaction the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake discussions with
the IAEA. Id. at 38.
24 See The Global Fallout, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1986, at 57.
France plans no change in the continued development of a nuclear power program
which already provides 65%'o of the country's electricity. In West Germany, Social
Democrats, while failing to gain office during January 1987 elections, garnered
support for a total ban on nuclear power during their campaign for office. See id.
In Japan, a recent poll showed overwhelming anti-nuclear sentiment, yet the government plans to build 17 new reactors by 1996. Id. Soviet workers drafted for the
clean-up of Chernobyl have held work-stoppages and demonstrations. Id.
25 See 9 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 179 (1986). The resolution "deplored the absence of
any binding international rules on civilian safety and called for quick negotiations
on international accident reporting rules." Id.
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demned the secrecy of the Soviet Union. 2 6 On May 1, 1986, the
United States House of Representatives passed a resolution con27
demning the Soviet's failure to notify the world of the accident.
The resolution called upon the Soviets to permit the international
press to cover the situation and to allow the IAEA to investigate the
cause of the accident. 28 Congressman George Gekas (R. Pa.) asserted
that the Soviets had committed an international crime by not reporting
the tragedy. 29 In the Senate, a similar resolution called for both a
thorough investigation by the IAEA and the implementation of an
international requirement that any nation sustaining a nuclear accident
notify all neighboring countries immediately.30
26 Senator

Robert Dole (R. Kan.) observed:
[We all have a] right to know what really happened at Chernobyl ....
None of this information is Soviet 'national security' information, by any
legitimate standard. The release of this informatnion would not compromise
any military secrets or make the U.S.S.R. military vulnerable. The only
thing that the Soviets risk by release of this information is informed public
discussion of the accident, which might reveal Soviet technological or administrative shortcomings.
132 CONG. REc. 58, S5261 (daily ed. May 5, 1986).
27 H.R. Res. 440, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 57, H2307 (daily ed.
May 1, 1986). Representative Mary Oakar (D. Ohio) and Robert Walker (R. Pa.)
cosponsored the resolution, and Representative Dante Fascell (D. Fla.) introduced
certain amendments which were all agreed upon. Id. Representative Walker remarked
that he was particularly appalled by "the fact that the Soviet Union has not only
lied to the world, but has lied to its own people about the extent of the damage."
Id. at H2303. "Within a few miles of the reactor . .. there are people still out
working in fields and literally have a rain of death falling on them and are apparently
unaware that they are in any kind of danger." Id. at H2305. Senator Chic Hecht
(R. Nev.) observed that to the Soviets, "[slecrecy outweighs any consideration of
human safety." He also commented that "Mr. Gorbachev is a fraud ... [who]
does not care about people . . . [nor] the horrors of nuclear war." 132 CONG. REc.

58, S5135 (daily ed. May 5, 1986).
2 H.R. Res. 440, supra note 27, at H2307.
29 132 CONG. REc., 55, H2202 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Gekas). Representative Tom Lantos (D. Cal.) referred to events in the Soviet Union
as more than "just a human tragedy; it is a governmental crime. This globe is too
small and too fragile and too interdependent for Stalinist secrecy to determine the
fate-not only of the Soviet people - but'of the millions who lived beyond Soviet
borders." 132 CONG. Rnc. 57, H2285 (daily ed. May 1, 1986).
Several other Congressmen introduced resolutions finding the Soviet action to be
"unconscionable." See, e.g., 132 CONG. Rnc. 56, H2245 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1986)
(statement by Rep. Mario Biaggi (D. N.Y.)). Representative Biaggi described Soviet
credibility as "pitiful" and appealed to the Soviets to "come clean." Representative
Biaggi further noted that the Soviet's secrecy concerning Chernobyl had greater
implications, and advised that "[w]e better remember this incident at our Geneva
arms talks and absolutely insist that any agreements we enter into with the Soviets
have a strong mutual verification provision." Id.
S0 S. Res. 390, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 55, S5010 (daily ed. Apr.
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While enacting these resolutions, United States Congressmen compared the Soviet's management of the Chernobyl accident with the
United States management of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear
accident in 1979. 3' Within hours of the incident's occurance, TMI
officials had notified both state authorities and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Shortly thereafter, a local radio station broadcast information concerning the accident on its nightly newscast.3 2 In the
opinion of some observers, as the events of TMI unfolded, journalistic
overkill blew an admittedly serious problem out of proportion." In
comparison, the opposite reaction occurred at Chernobyl. A week
after the Chernobyl accident, Soviet citizens had to rely on rumor
and Western broadcasts for information.Y
LAW

No previous international convention requires prompt notification
of a nuclear accident. Several agreements between individual states,

29, 1986). A resolution introduced by Senator William Roth (D. W.Va.) asked the
President to raise the question of nuclear safety at the next United States-Soviet
summit and called upon the United States to offer appropriate technical and medical
assistance to the Soviet Union. Id.
Another resolution, introduced in the House, called upon all nations to agree to
inform "the entire world community and their neighboring countries as soon as
possible immediately [sic] when a nuclear disaster occurs ... and give them all
relevant information. That is the least that any people can do for the rest of
humanity." 132 CONG. REc. 56, H2245 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1986) (statement by Rep.
Dennis Hertel (D. Mich.)).
31 The accident occurred at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979.
The accident apparently resulted from a complicated chain of events beginning with
an error in routine maintenance. "In the course of the accident, the reactor fuel
began to heat up, degrading the metal encasing it and releasing radioactive material
into the reactor cooling water-and eventually outside the reactor building, where
the radioactive material was distributed to the surrounding countryside by the prevailing winds." Abbots, Nuclear Power After Three Mile Island, 37 Bus & Soc'v
Rnv. 18, 19 (1980-81).
32 On the evening of the TMI accident, United States network newscasts broadcast
word of the "worst nuclear accident to date." Kellman, Anxiety Over the TMI
Accident: An Essay on NEPA's Limits of Inquiry, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 219,
229 (1983).
33 See McCurdy, supra note 20, at 3. During Congressional debates concerning
H. R. Res 440, Representative Walker noted that "[there was an absolutely massive
infusion not only of people to tell the rest of the world about what was going on
at Three Mile Island, but also people to help ....
[Wie were literally deluged by
the free press." 132 CONG. REc. 57, H2305. (daily ed. May 1, 1986).
3' 9 INT'L ENvr.
REP. 140 (1986). "The Soviet authorities' reticence created
particularly intense anxiety for residents of the Ukranian capital ....
In Moscow
...
[a] cab driver echoed the official explanation ... several days after the accident,
that 'a little something' had happened in the Kiev region." Id.
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however, require the parties to advise each other promptly of any
serious operating incidents at nuclear facilities." The large number
36
of bilateral treaties providing for such an exchange of information
evidences the general acceptance of this practice as customary international law. 37 This custom establishes a rule of law binding all states
38
by such custom except those who openly oppose it during formation.
The United States is a party to several bilateral agreements concerning the exchange of technical information and cooperation in the
use and research of atomic energy.3 9 Many of these agreements are
between the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 40 and a
foreign institute or commission on nuclear energy. Such agreements,
however, primarily focus on the exchange of regulatory standards
and technical information concerning nuclear facilities, such as licensing requirements. 4' The exchange of information regarding operating incidents such as nuclear accidents is merely a small provision
included in the larger framework of the agreements. 42 None of the
31See, e.g., infra notes 36 and 41 and accompanying texts.
36 See, e.g., Arrangement Relating to Information in the Nuclear Field, Sept. 8,
1976, United States-Canada, 28 U.S.T. 8977, T.I.A.S. No. 8778; Arrangement for

the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters,
Apr. 11, 1977, United States-Iran, 29 U.S.T. 1052, T.I.A.S. No. 8867;, Arrangement
for the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Safety Research,
May 20, 1976, United States-Brazil, 29 U.S.T. 4634, T.I.A.S. No. 9071.
1, International custom is defined as "evidence of a general practice accepted as
law." Statute of the International Court, art. 38(1). For a discussion on the relationship between treaties and custom see Baxter, Treaties and Customs, REcUEn.
DES CouRs 25, 99-101 (1970).
11"If a custom becomes established as a general rule of international law, it
binds all States which have not opposed it, whether or not they themselves played
an active part in its formation." Wadlock, General Course on Public International
Law, 2 REcuErI DES COURS 1, 49-53 (1962).
9 For a list of some of these treaties see supra note 36 and infra note 41.

, The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, formerly the Atomic Energy Commission,
primarily regulates and licenses nuclear powerplants. W. Fox JR., FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY, § 2.12 (1983).
See, e.g., Technical Exchange in Regulatory Matters, Sept. 29, 1980, United
States-Japan,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10537. The preamble states that the
purpose of the agreement is to further "a mutual interest in a continuing exchange
of information pertaining to regulatory matters and of standards required or recommended by their organizations for the regulation of safety and environmental
impact of nuclear facilities." Id. at preamble. See also Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety Research Matters, Jan. 14, 1982,
United States-Brazil, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10513, at preamble. This treaty
repeats verbatim the language quoted above.
See, e.g., Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and
Safety Research Matters, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
41

42
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agreements defines what type of event will trigger mandatory notification nor do the agreements specify how early the state must advise
the other party to the treaty. The agreements provide that the information will be exchanged through written letters, reports, and
43
documents or by prearranged visits.

One such agreement between the United States and Brazil entered
into force on January 14, 1982." The scope of this agreement includes
the exchange of information concerning licensing of nuclear facilities,

reactor safety research results, and reports on operating experiences
such as nuclear incidents, accidents, and shut-downs.4 5 It specifically
provides for "early advice of important events, such as serious operating incidents . . . that are of immediate interest" to the parties."
Most United States agreements on atomic energy cooperation contain the same vague language regarding notification that is found in
the United States-Brazil agreement. One attempt to remedy the vagueness is found in an understanding between the United States and
the Philippines, which provides that the parties agree to make "special
efforts" to give early advice of important nuclear incidents.4 7 This
agreement does not define, however, just what "special efforts"
involve.
Other international agreements obligating the United States to notify other states of a domestic incident include a cooperation agreement with Mexico to protect the environment around the border
between the two nations.4 s In addition, the United States has mutually

41 See, e.g., Technical Exchange in Regulatory Matters, supra note 41, at art. 2,
para. 1. "The exchange of information under this Arrangement will be accomplished
through letters, reports, and other documents, and by visits and meetings arranged
in advance." Id.
- Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety
Research Matters, supra note 41. The Arrangement extends a five-year Arrangement
signed on May 20, 1976 which contained similar provisions. See Technical Information
Exchange, May 20, 1976, United States-Brazil, 29 U.S.T. 4634, T.I.A.S. No. 9071.
41 Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety
Research Matters, supra note 41, at art. I. 1. Information is exchanged only to "the
extent that the U.S.N.R.C. [United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission] and the
C.N.E.N. [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear of Brazil] are permitted to do so
under the laws, regulations, and policy directives of their respective countries." Id.
Id. at art. 1.1(g).
41 Technical Information Exchange and Nuclear Safety, United States-Philippines,
Mar. 28, 1980, 32 U.S.T. 1050, T.I.A.S. No. 9756. The agreement states: "Each
party will make special efforts to give early advice of important events, such as
serious operating incidents and government-directed reactor shutdowns, that are of
immediate interest to the other." Id. at art. I.1(h).
41 Agreement for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
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agreed with Mexico to designate an individual who will notify the
other state by the most rapid means possible of every polluting incident
which could have adverse transboundary affects .49 This agreement is
much more detailed as to what information must be given and to
whom. It sets out four operational phases for when an accident
occurs, the first of which is notification.The United States, however, is not the only state to address the
early notification problem. The European Community has issued
directives dealing specifically with early notification of a nuclear
accident. Euratom5' Directive 80/836, adopted by the Council of the
European Communities, provides that member states must notify "as
a matter of urgency" neighboring states of any accident which could
expose the public to radioactivity. 2 The Directive encompasses any
hazardous activity arising from ionizing radiation53 and applies to all
members of the European Community.5 4 It does not, however, state

Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, United States-Mexico,
- U.S.T. __,
T.I.A.S. No.
10827. This agreement imposes a duty to inform the other state of a proposed
activity which may have transboundary environmental consequences before those
consequences occur. The purpose of this information is to allow a state to assess
extraterritorial dangers and explore alternatives to prevent transboundary pollution
before it occurs. The agreement does not, however, contain guidelines on what
information must be given or when such information must be given. See id.
49Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment,
July 24, 1980, United States-Mexico, Annex 1, 32 U.S.T. 5899, T.I.A.S. No. 10021.
The agreement fully entered into force March 30, 1981. Id.
"0Id. at Annex IV. Phase one is discovery, notification and alarm. Phase two
is evaluation of the incident, consultations and agreement on joint response. Phase
three is containment and measures against the spread of the pollutant, and the final
phase is cleanup and recovery. Id. The agreement provides that "[tihe existence of
any polluting incident which is affecting or threatens the other Party will be communicated, without delay ....
A prompt reaction is vital to achieve satisfactory
results from an operation." Id. at Annex V.
1, Euratom is an organization of the European Communities whose purpose is
to develop research of nuclear techniques, to establish and apply uniform nuclear
safety standards, and to facilitate atomic investment. See J. POLACH, EURATOM 28
(1964).
52 Council Directive of July 15, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 246), art. 45
para. 5. Article 45 provides that "[a]ny accident involving exposure of the population
must be notified as a matter of urgency, when the circumstances so require, to
neighboring Member States and to the Commission." Id.
11Id. at art. 2. The scope of application includes "the production, processing,
handling, use, holding, storage, transport and disposal of natural and artificial
radioactive substances and to any other activity which involves a hazard arising
from ionizing radiation." Id.
Id. at art. 3. "Each Member State shall make the reporting of the activities
referred to in Article 2 compulsory." Id.
14
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what information must be given other than the occurrence of the
accident.
The Council of the European Community issued another directive
on August 20, 1986.11 This directive came in response to a resolution
by the European Parliament calling for more specific notification
56
requirements to further enhance the rapid exchange of information.
The directive obligates member states to notify the Commission of
any accident, its time, place, facility, cause, level of radioactivity,
and foreseeable behavior.17 States must supplement this data with
subsequently obtained information58 and supply all available information likely to be useful in protecting the health and safety of the
public and environment. 9
ANALYSIS

The Vienna Convention on Early Notification greatly improves the
existing law on notification concerning nuclear accidents by clarifying
a state's duties to the international community when a nuclear accident
occurs within that state's borders. 6° The Convention clearly specifies
the information which must be provided to other state parties who
are, or may be physically affected by the accident. 61 Further, the
convention expressly defines the role of the IAEA in channeling
information regarding nuclear accidents. 62 The Convention does not,
however, define in detail certain key terms and requirements but
63
leaves interpretation of these terms to the discretion of each state.
Although the Convention is an improvement of the existing law in
151985-86

EUR. PAR. Doc. (COM No. 86) (1986).
Id. at preamble. The directive states as one of its purposes that "in the light
of recent events, it is essential that information on unusually high levels of radioactivity should be available in all Member States and that therefore means should
exist for the rapid delivery and exchange at Community level of information concerning such unusually high levels and of the measures taken and recommendations
issued by the competent national authorities of all Member States." Id. at preamble,
para. 14.
1 Id. at art. l(l)(a).
56Id. at art. 2(2).
11Id. at art. l(l)(b).
60 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
61 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 5 for a list of information which
must be provided. For a partial list, see text accompanying note 68 infra.
62 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4.
63 For example, the Convention does not clearly define which states must be
notified or how quickly such notification must take place. See infra notes 74 and
76 and accompanying text for a discussion of these problems.
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the area of notification, its major flaw is the limitation on the scope
of accidents to which it applies. 64
Existing customary international law mandates only that states give
early advice of important operating incidences at nuclear reactor
facilities .65 This custom, however, derived from treaties which were
not aimed at providing notice of a nuclear accident. 66 The provisions
requiring notice of serious operating incidents within these treaties
appear to have been inserted merely as a precautionary measure never
likely to be used or needed. 67 The Convention expands the customary
law by stipulating that states must provide more detailed information
including notice of the accident, its time, location, nature, cause,
and foreseeable developments. 68 Morever, the Convention does not
affect reciprocal rights and obligations under existing treaties between
states, such as the information exchange agreement between the United
69
States and Brazil.
The Convention additionally requires states to supplement the original information as the situation develops and the state gathers further
information. 70 This requirement is important given the nature of

64 See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2. See also infra note 88 and accompanying
text for a discussion on the limited scope of application of the convention.
65 For a discussion of existing international custom see supra note 38. See also,
e.g., Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety
Research Matters, supra note 41. Article 1.1(g) of the Treaty provides that parties
agree to exchange "[ejarly advice of important events, such as serious operating incidents and government-directed reactor shutdowns, that are of immediate interest
to the parties." Id.
I See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the custom.
67 The precautionary intent of the language is evidenced by the location of this
provision in the scope of the agreements. See Technical Exchange in Regulatory
Matters, supra note 41 at art. 1, para. 1(g) which lists notice of serious operating
incidents as the last of seven types of information to be exchanged. See also Technical
Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety Research Matters,
supra note 41 at art. I, para. 1(g) which lists notification of "serious operating
incidents" as seventh out of eight types of information covered by the agreement.
68 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2.
69 The Convention supplements and expands but does not limit previous international agreements. See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 10. Article 10 states that
"[t]his Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of State
Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered
by this Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance
with the object and purpose of this Convention." Id.
70 Convention, supranote 4, at art. 5, para. 2. Article 5 provides that "information
shall be supplemented at appropriate intervals by further relevant information on
the development of the emergency situation, including its foreseeable or actual
termination." Id.
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nuclear accidents and the rapid changes which may occur in radiation
levels. Previous treaties, such as the agreement between the United
States and the Philippines, 71 made no reference to updating information nor to responding to requests for further information.
Although the Convention improves customary international law in
the area of notification, its present form leaves certain problems
unresolved. While the Convention clearly specifies what information
a state must provide, it does not precisely define how quickly states
must provide such information. In this respect, the Convention neither
changes nor improves the existing law. 72 For example, the treaty
concerning information exchanges between the United States and
Brazil simply sets out that "early" advice must be given. 73 Likewise,
the Vienna Convention merely provides that states shall "promptly"
and "forthwith" communicate the required information. 74 Instead of
leaving the decision as to what is "prompt" to the discretion of each
state, the drafters of the Vienna Convention should have furnished
75
some guidelines as to how soon a state must provide the information.
The drafters should have stipulated that states shall be required to
Technical Information Exchange and Nuclear Safety, supra note 47.
The bilateral treaties did, however, provide that information was to be exchanged by letters, reports, documents, or pre-arranged meetings. See supra note
43 and accompanying text. Clearly the aforementioned methods would be inadequate
to effectively inform neighboring states that a catastrophic nuclear accident has
occurred near their borders. The Convention does not limit the means by which
notification must be given.
73 Technical Information Exchange and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety
Research Matters, supra note 41 at art. I.l(g).
74 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2. Article 2 provides that "[in the event of
an accident ... the State Party . . . shall forthwith notify ... of the nuclear accident
and promptly provide ... available information." Id.
7 For a discussion on the problems of allowing states to make "ad hoc" decisions
which have transboundary environmental impact, see Carroll & Mack, On Living
Together in North America: Canada, the United States and InternationalEnvironmental Relations, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 35 (1983). " 'Ad-hockery' provides
no certainty as to how an issue will be handled in the future. Each issue is disposed
of separately, often in a heated and emotional atmosphere generated by the media."
Id. at 41.
"Many commentators believe that detailed and binding international regulations
are necessary for the rational solution of transfrontier environmental problems."
See Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico and the
United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 87, 134 (1986) [hereinafter Environmental Cooperation Agreement].
Additionally, some scholars have proposed that a duty to inform prior to an
accident should be imposed. They argue that states should be informed of activities
"which can be prejudicial to their sovereignty or affect environmental quality." See
A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 147 (1983).
7,
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give notice of a nuclear accident no later than a certain number of
hours after the accident. Such a provision would have assured a more
uniform and equitable application of the Convention.
The Vienna Convention further allows each state to determine who
will be notified by allowing that state to decide for itself which states
are or may be physically affected by the accident .76 International
custom similarly allows states to determine for themselves which states
are to be considered affected or threatened by a nuclear incident and
thereby entitled to notification. 77 The drafters of the Convention could
have improved upon this custom by specifying that all states within
a given minimum radius of the accident, and additionally, any other
states who are or may be physically affected, must be notified.
Alternatively, the drafters could have given the IAEA the full responsibility to inform the states whom the IAEA determines are or
may be physically affected. This alternative would assure that changing political administrations and other political pressures would play
no part in the decision to notify. 78 Additionally, the Convention
should obligate the IAEA to issue health warnings and inform the
citizens of the state in which the accident occurs. 79 The inexcusable
lack of information available to the Soviet citizens after Chernobyl
illustrates the importance of such a provision.80
The most serious problem with the Convention, however, is the
limited scope of accidents to which it applies. The Convention applies
to accidents from all uses of nuclear energy except those from the

76 Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 2, 5 and 6. Article 6 provides that states
shall "respond promptly to a request for further information or consultations sought
by an affected State Party." Id. The problem of determining which states to notify
does not arise in bilateral agreements since the parties to these agreements are bound
to notify only those states with whom they have agreed to do so.
77 The reason for international custom allowing for self determination of affected
or threatened states lies in the fact that the treaties from which this custom derived
made no specific provisions regarding who must be notified. See supra note 36.
78 "Several factors make binational solutions to these ecological [transboundary
pollution] problems extremely difficult. These factors include the differing ...
domestic legal regimes of the two nations, the lack of coordination between the
many agencies dealing with the problems, and the long tradition of mistrust between
the nations." See Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 75, at 102.
79 See Comment, Nuclear Accidents: Judicial Review of the NRC's Duty to Issue
a Health Warning, 9 FoRDHAm URBAN L.J. 353 (1980). This comment argues that
in the United States, the NRC has a nondiscretionary duty to the public to issue a
health warning as it becomes aware of radiological emissions. Id. at 370. Internationally, the IAEA should serve this function and issue health warnings to alert the
public exposed to the radiation of the health risks involved.
10 See supra note 27.
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use or testing of nuclear weapons."1 Article 3 of the Convention does
provide that states may voluntarily notify surrounding states if an
accident outside the scope of the Conivention occurs.8 2 In light of the
serious health consequences of nuclear radiation,8 3 however, the Convention should mandate notification of all nuclear accidents, irrespective of their origin.
The directive issued by the Council of the European Communities
on August 20, 198684 serves as a guide for a broad scope of application
in that it applies to any nuclear accident or release of radioactive
materials.8 5 This directive updates Euratom Directive 80/836 which
applies to any activity which involves a hazard arising from ionizing
radiation. 6 In addition, the 1980 pollution agreement between the
United States and Mexico provides that any polluting incident must
be communicated without delay. 8 These agreements recognize the
importance of notification of any incident which could affect the
health and lives of many people.
Addressing the issue of the scope of application of the convention,
most of national the experts who met at the Vienna Convention
agreed that the scope of the Convention was unduly narrowed by
excluding accidents from nuclear weapons.8 8 The United States was

11Convention,

supra note 4, at art. 2. See also Annex V, supra note 7, at 3, 6,

7, 11.

82 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3. "With a view to minimizing the radiological
consequences, States Parties may notify in the event of nuclear accidents other than
those specified in article 1." Id.
83 For a discussion of the effects of nuclear radiation see Stanfield, supra note
17, at 1647. The effects of radiation exposure include cataracts, damage to bone
marrow, and cancer. See Soviets Reveal Delayed Evacuation, OtherDetails of Nuclear
Accident, supra note 18. See also R. NADER & J. ABBOTTS, THE MENACE O1FATOMIC
ENERGY 71 (1977).
- 1985-86 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 86) (1986).
85 Id. at art. 1.1(a). "[Wjhenever a nuclear accident or other event occurs on
the territory of a Member State and there is the potential for, or actual occurrence
of, an abnormal high release of radioactive materials, the Member State shall

forthwith notify the Commission of the occurrence .

. . ."

Id.

See Council Directive of July 15, 1980, supra notes 52 and 53.
87 Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment,
supra note 49 at Annex V. "The existence of any polluting incident which is affecting
86

or threatens the other Party will be communicated, without delay .

. . ."

Id.

See Annex V, supra note 7. The expert from France noted that he would have
"preferred to see the scope of the convention extended to all nuclear accidents
irrespective of their origin, and the limitation on the scope was regrettable." Id. at
11. The Iranian expert "was strongly of the belief that all incidents relating to
nuclear safety with radiological consequences should be notified." Id. at 12. The
Indonesian representative favored the widest possible scope, as did those from
Argentina, Greece, Japan, and Spain. Id. at 20.
88
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virtually the only country to oppose full-scope coverage,8 9 and until
the final day of the Convention, the United States had instructed its
representative to oppose any inclusion, implicit or explicit, of accidents
associated with nuclear weapons2 ° The delegates reached a compromise by including article 3, and the five states with nuclear weapons
agreed to voluntarily notify in the event of an accident involving
nuclear weapons. Therefore, no reason exists to prevent making such
notification mandatory. 9' The effect on these countries would be
virtually the same, especially given the United States argument that
full scope was unnecessary due to the unlikelihood of an accident
from nuclear weapons. 92 As the Convention now reads, if a state
sustains a major accident in testing nuclear weapons which has serious
transboundary effects, that state is morally but not legally obligated
to notify. The consequences of such inaction could severely harm the
lives of many.
CONCLUSION

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident is an
important step towards a safer and healthier enyironment. The Convention greatly improves existing customary international law on early

89 Only two countries had not been in favor of the full scope coverage of the
Convention, the United States and Great Britain. See id. at 12.
'o Id. at 4. The United States opposed the inclusion of accidents associated with
nuclear weapons for national security reasons. Id. Notification of a nuclear accident,
however, would not pose a threat to military secrets. The object of the Convention
is to protect the health of the population, not to further political ends or protect
commercial interests.
9, The United States stated that it would, "as a matter of national policy,
voluntarily provide notification about all accidents which had or might have transboundary effects." Id. at 4, 6, 7, 11.
The expert from Ireland noted that "[it was regrettable that, although all the
nuclear-weapons States had indicated their willingness to notify in the event of any
nuclear accident which might be of radiological significance for another State, not
all had found it possible to make such notification mandatory within the framework
of the draft convention." Id. at 36.
92 The expert from India stated that if accidents from nuclear weapons were so
unlikely because of:
fool-proof safety precautions . . . there would be no reason not to include
them under the draft conventions, as the nuclear-weapon States would then
in any case have virtually nothing to notify. The argument based on national
security also was not convincing; no one wished to breach national security
- what was required was merely an immediate notification of a nuclear
accident, whatever its source.
Id. at 20.
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notification which provides only that states should advise each other
of serious operating incidents at nuclear facilities. 93 With a goal of
minimizing the effect of a nuclear accident, the Convention clarifies
the rights and duties of state parties when such an accident occurs.
The Convention, however, should further clarify certain obligations,
namely who should be notified and how quickly such notification
should occur. More importantly, the Convention should include within
its scope accidents resulting from the use or testing of nuclear weapons, because the effects of ionizing radiation remain the same regardless of the source of such radiation.
In the face of expanding uses of nuclear energy, the Convention
does restore to the international community some confidence that the
harmful consequences of a nuclear accident might be reduced by
immediate action. Therefore, the Convention stands as a legal milestone in the consolidation of international cooperation in promoting
the safe use of nuclear energy.
Sharon McBrayer

93See supra notes 65 and 71 and accompanying text for a discussion on existing
law.

